Gallas v. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, et al. by unknown
2000 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
5-5-2000 
Gallas v. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, et al. 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2000 
Recommended Citation 
"Gallas v. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, et al." (2000). 2000 Decisions. 91. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2000/91 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2000 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
Filed May 5, 2000 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 








THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA; THE FIRST 
JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA; DEMOCRATIC 
CITY COMMITTEE; THE PHILADELPHIA CHAPTER OF 
THE TEAMSTERS UNION TEAMSTERS LOCAL 115; DOES 
1-100; ROBERT N.C. NIX, JR., HONORABLE, in his 
official capacity as CHIEF JUSTICE, SUPREME COURT 
OF PENNSYLVANIA; JOHN P. FLAHERTY, JR., 
HONORABLE, in his official capacity as JUSTICE OF THE 
SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA; STEPHEN A. 
ZAPPALA, HONORABLE, individually and in his official 
capacity as JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT OF 
PENNSYLVANIA; RALPH J. CAPPY, HONORABLE, 
individually and in his official capacity as JUSTICE OF 
THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA; RONALD D. 
CASTILLE, HONORABLE, in his official capacity as 
JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA; 
RUSSELL M. NIGRO, HONORABLE, individually and in 
his official capacity as JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME 
COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA; SANDRA SCHULTZ 
NEWMAN, HONORABLE, in her official capacity as 
JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA; 
NANCY SOBOLEVITCH, individually and in her official 
capacity as COURT ADMINISTRATOR OF PENNSYLVANIA; 
ALEX BONAVITACOLA, HONORABLE, individually and in 
his official capacity as PRESIDENT JUDGE, COURT OF 
COMMON PLEAS; ESTHER SYLVESTER, HONORABLE, 
individually and in her official capacity as JUDGE, 
COURT OF COMMON PLEAS FAMILY DIVISION; VINCENT 
FUMO, HONORABLE, individually and in his official 
 
 
       * Honorable Arthur L. Alarcon, Senior Judge of the United States 
Court 
       of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, sitting by designation. 
capacity as PENNSYLVANIA STATE SENATOR; JOSEPH 
DIPRIMIO, individually and in his official capacity as 
DEPUTY COURT ADMINISTRATOR FAMILY DIVISION, 
DOMESTIC RELATIONS BRANCH; ROBERT BRADY, 
individually and in his official capacity as CHAIRMAN, 
DEMOCRATIC CITY COMMITTEE; JOHN MORRIS, 
individually and in his official capacity as Secretary- 
Treasurer of Teamsters Local Union No. 115 
 
       Geoff Gallas, 
 
       Appellant 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civ. No. 96-06450) 
District Judge: Honorable William H. Yohn, Jr. 
 
Argued March 20, 2000 
 
BEFORE: MANSMANN, GREENBERG, and 
ALARCON,* Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: May 5, 2000) 
 
       Glenn J. Brown 
       246 West Broad Street 
       Quakertown, PA 18951 
 
       Peter G. Friesen (argued) 
       656 Fifth Avenue, Suite F 
       San Diego, CA 92101 
 
        Attorneys for Appellant 
 
                                2 
       William H. Lamb (argued) 
       William P. Mahon 
       Lamb, Windle & McErlane, P.C. 
       24 East Market Street 
       P.O. Box 565 
       West Chester, PA 19381-0565 
 
        Attorneys for Appellees 
       Honorable Ralph J. Cappy, 
       Honorable Stephen A. Zappala, 
       Honorable Russell M. Nigro, and 
       Nancy Sobolevitch 
 
       Alan J. Davis (argued) 
       Burt M. Rublin 
       Ballard Spahr Andrews & Ingersoll, 
       LLP 
       1735 Market Street 
       51st Floor 
       Philadelphia, PA 19103-7599 
 
        Attorneys for Appellee 
       Honorable Russell M. Nigro 
 
       James E. Beasley (argued) 
       David A. Yanoff 
       Beasley, Casey & Erbstein 
       1125 Walnut Street 
       Philadelphia, PA 19107-4997 
 
        Attorneys for Appellees 
       The First Judicial District of 
       Pennsylvania, 
       Honorable Alex Bonavitacola, 
       Honorable Esther Sylvester, 
       and Joseph DiPrimio 
 
       Richard A. Sprague (argued) 
       Geoffrey R. Johnson 
       Sprague & Sprague 
       Suite 400, Wellington Building 
       135 South 19th Street 
       Philadelphia, PA 19103 
 
        Attorneys for Appellee 
       Vincent J. Fumo 
 
                                3 
       Gabriel L.I. Bevilacqua 
       Stephen M. Donweber 
       Saul, Ewing, Remick & Saul LLP 
       Centre Square West 
       1500 Market Street, 38th Floor 
       Philadelphia, PA 19102 
 
        Attorneys for Appellees 
       Robert Brady and the Democratic 
       City Committee 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
 




This matter comes on before this court on appeal from 
various orders of the district court dismissing appellant 
Geoff Gallas' claims arising under 42 U.S.C.  1983 and 
Pennsylvania common law. Gallas brought this action 
against various defendants, including the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court and several of its justices, principally 
alleging that they terminated him from his position as 
Executive Administrator of the First Judicial District of 
Pennsylvania in violation of his constitutional rights and 
that court personnel unlawfully invaded his privacy when 
they publicly disclosed documents from domestic 
proceedings in which he was involved. The district court 
dismissed or granted the defendants summary judgment on 
each of Gallas' claims prior to trial. For the reasons we set 
forth herein, we will affirm. 
 
A. Factual Background 
 
On December 19, 1990, the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court, reacting to budgetary and administrative problems 
in the Philadelphia courts which comprise the First Judicial 
District ("FJD"), issued an order assuming control over the 
FJD. J.A. at 304, 412. See In re Blake, 593 A.2d 1267, 
1268 (Pa. 1991). Pursuant to the order, the court assigned, 
respectively, Justice Ralph Cappy the task of "overseeing 
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the reformation of the Administrative Structure of the 
Courts of the First Judicial District," and Justice Nicholas 
Papadakos the task of "overseeing the Budgetary Structure" 
of those courts. J.A. at 304. The Supreme Court, however, 
intended that its oversight of the FJD would be temporary, 
with control eventually returned to local judges and 
officials. J.A. at 413. 
 
In the summer of 1991, a committee chaired by Justices 
James McDermott and Stephen Zappala of the Supreme 
Court conducted a search to select an Executive 
Administrator who would have the responsibility of 
"overseeing the administration of all ministerial functions" 
in the FJD's courts. J.A. at 415. This search resulted in 
Gallas' hiring for this position effective December 1, 1991. 
J.A. at 80, 415. According to Gallas' amended complaint, 
during the selection process Justices Zappala and Cappy 
and Nancy Sobolevitch, the Court Administrator of 
Pennsylvania, conveyed the importance of "instituting a 
`merit system' whereby employment and other issues in the 
FJD would be strictly governed by proper personnel 
processes, qualifications and performance"; these 
individuals further indicated to Gallas that "use of political 
patronage to fill positions in all three Philadelphia courts 
[Court of Common Pleas, Municipal Court, and Traffic 
Court] making up the FJD had been a serious problem in 
Philadelphia." J.A. at 85. 
 
Gallas' complaint indicates that he "expressed concern 
and reticence about taking the job . . . [because] 
Philadelphia and its courts were vulnerable to improper 
political influence . . . [and] many persons, both inside and 
outside the FJD, previously derived improper benefit from 
that influence." J.A. at 85-86. This concern led Gallas to 
worry about job security, J.A. at 86, and prompted him to 
negotiate an oral "severance arrangement" which would 
entitle him to certain benefits if he should leave or be 
discharged. Supp. App. at 1206-11, 1214, 1708-17. 
 
Gallas served as Executive Administrator for 
approximately four and one-half years. According to Gallas' 
complaint, during the course of his service various 
individuals pressured him to acquiesce in patronage 
appointments in the FJD. Gallas claims that in 1992 
 
                                5 
Justices Zappala and Cappy instructed him to 
accommodate job appointments favored by two public 
figures, Pennsylvania State Senator Vincent Fumo and 
Robert Brady,1 the chairman of the Democratic City 
Committee. Gallas alleges that Zappala and Cappy 
specifically warned him that his failure to honor Fumo's 
requests could result in the loss of his job. J.A. at 87-88. 
Gallas further alleges that Fumo and Brady and their 
respective associates contacted him on multiple occasions 
concerning requests that certain individuals be hired or 
promoted. J.A. at 87-88. According to Gallas, he resisted 
demands for such appointments, and in March 1993, Fumo 
and Brady told him that his failure to honor their requests 
would lead them to "turn the dogs" on him. J.A. at 88. As 
the district court summarized, Gallas endured a"rocky" 
tenure as Executive Administrator during which he 
"attempted to walk a fine line between accommodating the 
personnel requests of local politicians and instituting 
objective, process-oriented standards for making personnel 
decisions." Gallas v. Supreme Court of Pa. , No. CIV. A. 96- 
6450, 1998 WL 22081, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 22, 1998). 
 
Gallas' service as Executive Administrator came to an 
end pursuant to a March 26, 1996 order of the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court (the "March 26 order") which 
provided for an "administrative reorganization of the First 
Judicial District." According to affidavits from justices of 
the Supreme Court, the court issued this order because the 
progress that had been achieved during the Supreme 
Court's oversight justified returning the FJD to local control.2 
J.A. at 412, 425, 427. The March 26 order eliminated the 
position of Executive Administrator and created an 
Administrative Governing Board for the FJD to be 
comprised of the three president judges and the three 
administrative judges of the district, along with the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Brady was elected to Congress after this action was instituted. See 
Appellee Zappala's Br. at 2 n.1. 
 
2. In April 1993, the Supreme Court vacated its December 19, 1990 
order and issued an order lessening its involvement in the day-to-day 
operations of the FJD. This order was the first step in the process of 
returning the FJD to local control. J.A. at 165, 417. That process 
culminated in the March 26, 1996 order. J.A. at 412. 
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Administrator of the Pennsylvania Courts. The order 
directed the Administrative Governing Board to select a 
Court Administrator and Budget Administrator for the FJD, 
with the persons in these two positions being responsible 
for many of the duties the Executive Administrator had 
performed. The order named Gallas as Budget 
Administrator effective April 1, 1996, "[s]ince it is 
anticipated that it may take a short time . . . for the 
Administrative Governing Board to organize itself."3 J.A. at 
308-12. 
 
Meanwhile, there were problems in Gallas' marriage, and 
on September 22, 1995, his wife filed a Petition for 
Protection from Abuse ("PFA") alleging that he had 
physically abused her. J.A. at 92. Gallas claims that court 
personnel improperly released this PFA to the public on 
three separate occasions. According to Gallas' complaint, 
unknown court personnel released the contents of the PFA 
to the Democratic City Committee "within two hours" of its 
filing. J.A. at 93. Then, on September 26, 1995, the PFA 
was released to the Philadelphia Daily News by order of 
Esther Sylvester, the Administrative Judge of the Family 
Division of the Court of Common Pleas. J.A. at 93. 
According to the complaint, the newspaper secured this 
order through a request made by one of its reporters to 
Joseph DiPrimio, the Deputy Court Administrator of the 
Family Court Division.4 J.A. at 92-93. Finally, on or before 
March 23, 1996, unknown individuals again publicly 
released the PFA, along with the file from Gallas' divorce 
proceeding. J.A. at 98. 
 
B. Procedural History 
 
Gallas commenced this action on September 23, 1996, 
asserting claims for monetary relief against various 
defendants based on his termination and the releases of the 
documents from his domestic proceedings. In Counts I-III of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Gallas later unsuccessfully applied for the position of Court 
Administrator. J.A. at 423. Gallas is no longer serving as Budget 
Administrator. See Appellant's Br. at 13. 
 
4. Gallas alleges that the Philadelphia Daily News reported the contents 
of the PFA in a September 27, 1995 article entitled"Court Official a Wife 
Beater?" J.A. at 94. 
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his amended complaint, Gallas raised claims under section 
1983 for invasion of privacy with respect to the three 
releases of the PFA and the release of the divorcefile. In 
these counts he named as defendants the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court, the FJD, Judge Sylvester, DiPrimio, and 
the Democratic City Committee, along with Teamsters Local 
Union No. 115 (the "Teamsters") and 60 Doe defendants. 
J.A. at 96-99.5 The main allegation with respect to the 
Teamsters is that its secretary-treasurer obtained the PFA 
and made false statements about it in a publication entitled 
the Court Reporter on September 28, 1995. J.A. at 94, 103. 
It appears that the Teamsters became involved with the 
FJD and thus Gallas because of its attempt to represent 
certain court employees. In Count IV, also brought 
pursuant to section 1983, Gallas alleged that his 
termination as Executive Administrator violated his First 
and Fourteenth Amendment rights because it was 
undertaken in retaliation for his opposition to political 
patronage and was accomplished without notice and a 
hearing. This count named various defendants, including 
the Supreme Court and its justices, the FJD, Sobolevitch, 
Fumo, and 20 Doe defendants. J.A. at 99-101. In Count V, 
Gallas alleged a breach of employment contract against the 
Supreme Court and the FJD. J.A. at 101-02. In Count VI, 
Gallas alleged that Fumo, Brady, the Democratic City 
Committee, and 20 Doe defendants interfered with his 
contract for employment as Executive Administrator by 
inducing the Supreme Court to terminate him. J.A. at 102- 
03. Finally, in Count VII, Gallas alleged defamation against 
the Teamsters and its secretary-treasurer. J.A. at 103-04. 
 
The district court dismissed or granted the defendants 
summary judgment on each of Gallas' claims in response to 
various motions by the defendants. See Gallas v. Supreme 
Court of Pa., No. CIV.A. 96-6450, 1998 WL 599249 (E.D. 
Pa. Aug. 24, 1998); Gallas v. Supreme Court of Pa., No. 
CIV.A. 96-6450, 1998 WL 352584 (E.D. Pa. June 15, 1998); 
Gallas v. Supreme Court of Pa., No. CIV.A. 96-6450, 1998 
WL 22081 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 22, 1998); Gallas v. Supreme 
Court of Pa., No. CIV.A. 96-6450, 1997 WL 256972 (E.D. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. He did not name each of these defendants in all of the three counts. 
 
                                8 
Pa. May 15, 1997). We will summarize only those rulings of 
the district court which are at issue on this appeal.6 
 
On May 16, 1997, the district court entered a 
memorandum and order which dismissed, on the basis of 
absolute judicial immunity, Gallas' claims against Judge 
Sylvester and DiPrimio arising from Judge Sylvester's order 
releasing the PFA. See Gallas, 1997 WL 256972, at *11-12. 
In the same memorandum and order, the district court 
dismissed Gallas' procedural due process claim to the 
extent that he based it on the alleged deprivation of a 
liberty interest; in this regard, the court found that Gallas 
failed to allege that he was stigmatized in connection with 
his termination as Executive Administrator. See id. at *19. 
On January 22, 1998, the district court entered an order 
and memorandum granting summary judgment against 
Gallas on the procedural due process claim to the extent 
that he based it on the alleged deprivation of a property 
interest; in this connection, the court concluded that there 
was insufficient evidence to establish that Gallas was 
anything other than an at-will employee. See Gallas, 1998 
WL 22081, at *4-6. Then, on June 15, 1998, the district 
court entered an order and memorandum holding that 
Justices Zappala, Cappy, and Russell Nigro, along with 
Sobolevitch, were entitled to absolute legislative immunity 
with respect to Gallas' First Amendment claim arising from 
his termination as Executive Administrator. See Gallas, 
1998 WL 352584, at *3-10. Gallas claims that these rulings 
were erroneous. 
 
Gallas also has appealed certain discovery rulings by the 
district court. On September 9, 1998, the district court 
entered a memorandum and order quashing certain 
subpoenas which Gallas had issued for the purpose of 
conducting discovery as to the identities of the Doe 
defendants designated in the complaint. J.A. at 892. Then, 
on November 10, 1998, the district court entered an order 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. The district court dismissed Gallas' claims against several of the 
defendants, including certain justices of the Supreme Court who were 
sued for monetary relief only in their official capacities on Eleventh 
Amendment grounds. See Gallas, 1997 WL 256972, at *5-8, *16-17. 
Gallas does not challenge these dismissals. 
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and memorandum granting summary judgment against 
Gallas on his interference with his employment claim; in so 
ruling, the court declined to extend the discovery deadline 
to permit Gallas to conduct further discovery relating to 
this claim. J.A. at 1146. Gallas argues that these rulings 





The district court had jurisdiction over Gallas' section 
1983 claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C.  1331 and 1343 and 
supplemental jurisdiction over his state law claims 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C.  1367. We have jurisdiction over 




A. Judicial Immunity 
 
The first issue on appeal is whether Judge Sylvester and 
DiPrimio are entitled to absolute judicial immunity with 
regard to Judge Sylvester's order releasing the PFA to the 
Philadelphia Daily News. Following a motion to dismiss, the 
district court held that Judge Sylvester's order, as 
described in the amended complaint, constituted a judicial 
act for purposes of absolute immunity. See Gallas, 1997 
WL 256972, at *11-12. Our review of the district court's 
order is plenary. See Children's Seashore House v. 
Waldman, 197 F.3d 654, 658 (3d Cir. 1999). 
 
The Supreme Court long has recognized that judges are 
immune from suit under section 1983 for monetary 
damages arising from their judicial acts. See Mireles v. 
Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 9, 112 S.Ct. 286, 287 (1991); Forrester 
v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 225-27, 108 S.Ct. 538, 543-44 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. According to Gallas' notice of appeal, "[t]he scope of this appeal 
includes all rulings of the [district] court pertaining to all named and 
unnamed defendants to this action as it was originally filed and later 
amended." J.A. at 1. Nevertheless, based on the issues presented and 
argued in Gallas' brief, we understand that he challenges only the 
rulings of the district court which we have described. 
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(1988); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 355-56, 98 S.Ct. 
1099, 1104 (1978). The Court has described the reasons for 
recognizing this form of immunity as follows: 
 
       [T]he nature of the adjudicative function requires a 
       judge frequently to disappoint some of the most intense 
       and ungovernable desires that people can have . . . . 
       [T]his is the principal characteristic that adjudication 
       has in common with legislation and with criminal 
       prosecution, which are the two other areas in which 
       absolute immunity has most generously been provided. 
       If judges were personally liable for erroneous decisions, 
       the resulting avalanche of suits, most of them frivolous 
       but vexatious, would provide powerful incentives for 
       judges to avoid rendering decisions likely to provoke 
       such suits. The resulting timidity would be hard to 
       detect or control, and it would manifestly detract from 
       independent and impartial adjudication. 
 
Forrester, 484 U.S. at 226-27, 108 S.Ct. at 544 (citations 
omitted). 
 
We must engage in a two-part inquiry to determine 
whether judicial immunity is applicable. "First, a judge is 
not immune from liability for nonjudicial actions, i.e., 
actions not taken in the judge's judicial capacity." Mireles, 
502 U.S. at 11, 112 S.Ct. at 288. "Second, a judge is not 
immune for actions, though judicial in nature, taken in the 
complete absence of all jurisdiction." Id.  at 12, 112 S.Ct. at 
288. With respect to the first inquiry, "the factors 
determining whether an act by a judge is a `judicial' one 
relate to the nature of the act itself, i.e., whether it is a 
function normally performed by a judge, and to the 
expectations of the parties, i.e., whether they dealt with the 
judge in his judicial capacity." Stump, 435 U.S. at 362, 98 
S.Ct. at 1107. Our task is to "draw the line between truly 
judicial acts, for which immunity is appropriate, and acts 
that simply happen to have been done by judges," such as 
administrative acts. Forrester, 484 U.S. at 227, 108 S.Ct. at 
544. 
 
With respect to the second inquiry, we must distinguish 
between acts in the "clear absence of all jurisdiction," which 
do not enjoy the protection of absolute immunity, and acts 
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that are merely in "excess of jurisdiction," which do enjoy 
that protection: 
 
       A distinction must be here observed between excess of 
       jurisdiction and the clear absence of all jurisdiction 
       over the subject-matter. Where there is clearly no 
       jurisdiction over the subject-matter any authority 
       exercised is a usurped authority, and for the exercise 
       of such authority, when the want of jurisdiction is 
       known to the judge, no excuse is permissible. But 
       where jurisdiction over the subject-matter is invested 
       by law in the judge, or in the court which he holds, the 
       manner and extent in which the jurisdiction shall be 
       exercised are generally as much questions for his 
       determination as any other questions involved in the 
       case, although upon the correctness of his 
       determination in these particulars the validity of his 
       judgments may depend. 
 
Stump, 435 U.S. at 356 n.6, 98 S.Ct. at 1104 n.6 (citation 
omitted). 
 
"A judge will not be deprived of immunity because the 
action he took was in error, was done maliciously, or was 
in excess of his authority; rather, he will be subject to 
liability only when he has acted in the `clear absence of all 
jurisdiction.' " Id. at 356-57, 98 S.Ct. at 1105 (citation 
omitted); see also Forrester, 484 U.S. at 227, 108 S.Ct. at 
544 (an act "does not become less judicial by virtue of an 
allegation of malice or corruption of motive"); Cleavinger v. 
Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 200, 106 S.Ct. 496, 500 (1985) ("Nor 
can this exemption of the judges from civil liability be 
affected by the motives with which their judicial acts are 
performed.") (citation omitted). Immunity will not be 
forfeited because a judge has committed "grave procedural 
errors," Stump, 435 U.S. at 359, 98 S.Ct. at 1106, or 
because a judge has conducted a proceeding in an 
"informal and ex parte" manner. Forrester , 484 U.S. at 227, 
108 S.Ct. at 544. Further, immunity will not be lost merely 
because the judge's action is "unfair" or controversial. See 
Cleavinger, 474 U.S. at 199-200, 106 S.Ct. at 500 
(immunity applies "however injurious in its consequences 
[the judge's action] may have proved to the plaintiff ") 
(citation omitted); Stump, 435 U.S. at 363-64, 98 S.Ct. at 
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1108 ("Disagreement with the action taken by the judge . . . 
does not justify depriving that judge of his immunity. . . . 
The fact that the issue before the judge is a controversial 
one is all the more reason that he should be able to act 
without fear of suit."). In sum, our analysis must focus on 
the general nature of the challenged action, without inquiry 
into such "specifics" as the judge's motive or the 
correctness of his or her decision. See Mireles , 502 U.S. at 
13, 112 S.Ct. at 288 ("[T]he relevant inquiry is the `nature' 
and `function' of the act, not the `act itself.' In other words, 
we look to the particular act's relation to a general function 
normally performed by a judge . . . .") (citation omitted). 
 
According to Gallas' complaint, Judge Sylvester ordered 
the release of the PFA "for no judicial purpose and for the 
sole purpose of injuring the reputation of [Gallas] . . . 
without notice to [Gallas], and without a hearing designed 
to consider just cause for the release of it." J.A. at 93-94. 
The complaint further alleges that Judge Sylvester"was 
motivated by a non-judicial intent to undermine[Gallas'] 
moral authority as Executive Administrator, and to assist 
political opponents of [Gallas] in terminating his 
employment." J.A. at 97. Gallas argues that Judge 
Sylvester's order releasing the PFA was an administrative 
act rather than a judicial one, "since clerks and not judges 
are typically the custodians of the public record." See 
Appellant's Br. at 27. Gallas further contends that Judge 
Sylvester acted in the absence of all jurisdiction; in this 
regard, he alleges that "[a]ll [PFAs] are impounded under 
the rules of the court, maintained in confidence, and were 
to be released only as evidence in a judicial proceeding, and 
then only upon judicial order following a verified petition 
properly noticed upon all interested parties." J.A. at 92. In 
addition, Gallas argues, though without citation to any 
authority, that only the judge actually assigned to his 
domestic proceedings had the power to order a release of 
the PFA. See Appellant's Br. at 31. 
 
Gallas' arguments notwithstanding, we hold that Judge 
Sylvester is entitled to the protection of judicial immunity. 
Her order, as described in the amended complaint, 
undeniably was a judicial act. Contrary to Gallas' argument 
that "clerks and not judges are typically the custodians of 
 
                                13 
the public record," Appellant's Br. at 27, the issuance of an 
order releasing a court record to the public is certainly a 
"function normally performed by a judge," and the 
newspaper reporter "dealt with the judge in [her] judicial 
capacity" when he approached Judge Sylvester (through 
DiPrimio) seeking an order releasing the PFA. See Stump, 
435 U.S. at 362, 98 S.Ct. at 1107. Indeed, Gallas' 
complaint states that Judge Sylvester's actions were taken 
"under the color of state law and as agent of the. . . [Court 
of Common Pleas]" and that Judge Sylvester"used the color 
of her authority under state law" to order the release of the 
PFA. See J.A. at 83, 97. These allegations recognize that 
Judge Sylvester was acting in her judicial capacity. See id. 
at 360, 98 S.Ct. at 1106 ("[W]e cannot characterize the 
approval of the petition as a nonjudicial act. [Plaintiffs] 
themselves stated in their pleadings before the District 
Court that Judge Stump was `clothed with the authority of 
the state' at the time that he approved the petition and that 
`he was acting as a county circuit court judge.' "). 
 
The fact that Judge Sylvester issued the order ex parte, 
without notice to Gallas or an opportunity for him to be 
heard, does not mean that her act was not judicial. In 
Stump, the Supreme Court held that a judge was absolutely 
immune with respect to his approval of a mother's ex parte 
petition for an order permitting the sterilization of her 
mentally challenged daughter. Id. at 355-64, 98 S.Ct. at 
1104-09. The Court squarely rejected the plaintiffs' 
argument that the approval of the petition was not a 
judicial act because it was "not given a docket number, was 
not placed on file with the clerk's office, and was approved 
in an ex parte proceeding without notice to the minor, 
without a hearing, and without the appointment of a 
guardian ad litem." Id. at 360-63, 98 S.Ct. at 1106-08. In 
the Court's view, "[b]ecause Judge Stump performed the 
type of act normally performed only by judges and because 
he did so in his capacity as a Circuit Court Judge, we find 
no merit to [plaintiffs'] argument that the informality with 
which he proceeded rendered his action nonjudicial and 
deprived him of his absolute immunity." Id.  at 362-63, 98 
S.Ct. at 1108.8 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. Gallas' brief states that "[h]ad Gallas been notified of the pending 
request for the release of [the PFA], and been given an opportunity to 
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Further, the allegations of the complaint do not indicate 
that Judge Sylvester acted in the clear absence of all 
jurisdiction. We will accept Gallas' allegation that Judge 
Sylvester violated a court "rule" which allowed the release 
of an impounded PFA only for purposes of its use as 
evidence in a judicial proceeding, and only then upon 
judicial order following a verified petition properly noticed 
to all interested parties.9 Yet, such a procedural error at 
most might establish that Judge Sylvester acted in excess 
of her jurisdiction, not that she acted in the clear absence 
of all jurisdiction. See id. at 359, 98 S.Ct. at 1106 ("A judge 
is absolutely immune from liability for his judicial acts even 
if his exercise of authority is flawed by the commission of 
grave procedural errors."); see also Mireles , 502 U.S. at 13, 
112 S.Ct. at 289 (holding that a judge merely acted in 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
respond to that request, then [Judge Sylvester's] decision may have risen 
to the level of a judicial decision, and thus been subject to immunity." 
Appellant's Br. at 27. Yet, the Supreme Court has made clear that an act 
does not lose its judicial character merely because it is done ex parte or 
is imbued with procedural error. Accordingly, if, as Gallas apparently 
concedes, Judge Sylvester's order would have been a judicial act had 
Gallas received notice and an opportunity to respond, then her order 
nevertheless was a judicial act even in the absence of such procedural 
protections. 
 
9. The court "rule" to which Gallas' complaint apparently refers was 
published as a "Court Notice[ ]" in The Legal Intelligencer. It reads as 
follows: 
 
        Please take note that Family Court records, including . . . 
       Protection from Abuse records . . . are impounded and are not 
       subject to inspection except by a party to the action or counsel of 
       record for the party whose records are to be inspected unless 
       otherwise provided by statute or rule. These records may not be 
       removed for copying or any other purpose except by special order of 
       the court. 
 
        If any of these records are required as evidence in a civil, 
criminal, 
       administrative or disciplinary proceeding, a verified petition 
setting 
       forth the reasons why the record is needed must befiled with the 
       Administrative Judge of the Family Court Division or his judicial 
       designee. An appropriate order must accompany the petition. 
 
J.A. at 129 (emphasis added). 
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excess of his authority in ordering police officers to use 
excessive force in bringing an attorney to his courtroom for 
a calendar call); Rolleston v. Eldridge, 848 F.2d 163, 164-65 
(11th Cir. 1988) ("Even assuming that Judge Eldridge had 
not followed procedural rules, his action would still be 
within his jurisdiction."). 
 
We recognize that Gallas contends that only the judge 
who actually presided over his domestic proceedings had 
the power to order a release of the PFA. But Gallas has not 
pointed to any rule or other authority indicating that Judge 
Sylvester did not have the authority to issue a release order.10 
Moreover, even if he did point to a rule that indicated that 
another judge should have entertained the application for 
release of the PFA, we would not hold that Judge Sylvester 
acted in the clear absence of all jurisdiction in issuing the 
order. 
 
In fact, we recently dealt with and rejected a similar 
claim in Figueroa v. Blackburn, No. 99-5252, ___ F.3d ___, 
2000 WL 340794 (3d Cir. Mar. 27, 2000). In Figueroa we 
held that a New Jersey municipal court judge had absolute 
judicial immunity for her act in holding a party in contempt 
and jailing him without granting a stay as required by court 
rule even though in hearing the case she acted contrary to 
a Supreme Court of New Jersey directive that required her 
to transfer the case to another judge. Thus, we hold that a 
judge does not act in the clear absence of all jurisdiction 
when the judge enters an order at least colorably within the 
jurisdiction of her court even though a court rule or other 
procedural constraint required another judge to act in the 
matter. We also note, though our result is not dependent 
on the point, that Judge Sylvester was the administrative 
judge of the Family Court Division and thus it might be 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. The record indicates that a judge of the Family Court Division 
ordered the records of Gallas' divorce and abuse proceedings sealed on 
October 26, 1995--well after Judge Sylvester ordered the release of the 
PFA. J.A. at 105-06. In any event, even if the record had been sealed 
prior to Judge Sylvester's order, this would not mean that she acted in 
the complete absence of all jurisdiction in releasing the PFA. Indeed, the 
October 26, 1995 sealing order stated that requests to view the sealed 
records could be approved by the motion court judge or the 
administrative judge. J.A. at 106. 
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expected that she would entertain the application for the 
release of the PFA in the sensitive situation in which the 
FJD's Executive Administrator was a party.11 
 
Finally, Gallas' allegations that Judge Sylvester ordered 
the release of the PFA "for no judicial purpose and for the 
sole purpose of injuring the reputation of [Gallas]," J.A. at 
93-94, and that Judge Sylvester "was motivated by a non- 
judicial intent to undermine [Gallas'] moral authority as 
Executive Administrator, and to assist political opponents 
of [Gallas] in terminating his employment," J.A. at 97, are 
irrelevant, as judicial immunity is not forfeited by 
allegations of "malice or corruption of motive." Forrester, 
484 U.S. at 227, 108 S.Ct. at 544; see also Stump, 435 U.S. 
at 363-64, 98 S.Ct. at 1108 (allegations that judge's action 
was "unfair" and "totally devoid of judicial concern for the 
interests and well-being of the young girl involved" could 
not overcome judicial immunity).12 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. Again though our result is not dependent on it, we note that the 
court "rule" regarding release of PFAs indicates that at least in some 
circumstances an interested party seeking their release should apply to 
the administrative judge or his judicial designee. See J.A. at 129. Judge 
Sylvester was the administrative judge. 
 
12. Gallas relies on Barrett v. Harrington , 130 F.3d 246 (6th Cir. 1997). 
In that case, the court held that a judge was entitled to absolute 
judicial 
immunity with respect to her conduct in notifying prosecutors that she 
was being harassed by a disgruntled litigant. See id. at 257-60. The 
court held that judicial immunity was not applicable, however, with 
respect to the judge's statements to members of the news media about 
the litigant. See id. at 260-61. In the court's view, "speaking to the 
media 
and giving interviews about a litigant on a case over which the judge has 
presided is not normally a judicial function nor is it usually in 
furtherance of a judicial function," because"[u]nlike filing a complaint 
with law enforcement . . . , speaking to the media .. . in no way protects 
the integrity of the judicial institution or the decision-making process." 
Id. at 261. Gallas seeks to draw an analogy between Judge Sylvester's 
order releasing the PFA to the media and the comments to the media 
made by the judge in Barrett. This analogy must fail. While a judge may 
"step[ ] out of her judicial role" when she chooses to talk to the media 
about a litigant appearing before her, see id. , a judge certainly does 
not 
step out of her judicial role when she entertains a petition for an order 
releasing a court record. 
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We recognize that the complaint contains little 
information regarding the precise circumstances leading to 
Judge Sylvester issuing the order. We do not know, for 
example, whether the order was oral or written, whether 
legal argument was presented to Judge Sylvester prior to 
the issuance of the order, or whether legal counsel for the 
newspaper participated to any extent. We will assume that 
Judge Sylvester issued the order orally, with no 
presentation of a written petition or legal argument by the 
newspaper and no involvement by the newspaper's counsel. 
Nevertheless, even under these circumstances, Judge 
Sylvester's order was a judicial act not undertaken in the 
complete absence of jurisdiction.13 
 
Our conclusion that Judge Sylvester is entitled to 
absolute judicial immunity in turn demands that DiPrimio 
be accorded absolute "quasi-judicial" immunity. As 
mentioned, according to the complaint, the Philadelphia 
Daily News obtained the release order from Judge Sylvester 
by means of its reporter's request to DiPrimio. J.A. at 92- 
93. In the circumstances, we have no trouble concluding 
that he should be absolutely immune for simply acting as 
an intermediary between the newspaper and the judge. See 
Forrester, 484 U.S. at 225, 108 S.Ct. at 543 (indicating that 
the protections of judicial immunity extend to officials "who 
perform quasi-judicial functions"); Moore v. Brewster, 96 
F.3d 1240, 1244 (9th Cir. 1996) ("[Defendant], while acting 
as Clerk of the United States District Court . . . in many of 
his actions performed quasi-judicial functions. . . . Even if 
. . . [defendant] deceived [plaintiff] regarding the status of 
the [supersedeas] bond and improperly conducted hearings 
to assess costs, all in coordination with Judge Brewster, 
such acts would fall within [defendant's] quasi-judicial 
duties and are thus protected by absolute immunity."); 
McArdle v. Tronetti, 961 F.2d 1083, 1085 (3d Cir. 1992) 
(holding that a prison physician who prepared an 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. We note that the cases seem to refer interchangeably to a judge 
acting in the "complete" or "clear" absence of all jurisdiction. But 
plainly 
a judge does not lose immunity merely because it is later determined 
that in fact he or she did not have jurisdiction and in that sense the 
absence of jurisdiction was "complete." See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 
at 356-57, 98 S.Ct. at 1104-05. 
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evaluation of an inmate pursuant to a judge's request was 
"functioning as an arm of the court" and "[a]s such, he was 
an integral part of the judicial process and is protected by 
the same absolute judicial immunity that protects Judge 
Connelly"); Dellenbach v. Letsinger, 889 F.2d 755, 763 (7th 
Cir. 1989) ("[W]e conclude on the facts before us that the 
court personnel are entitled to absolute quasi-judicial 
immunity for their alleged acts . . . pursuant to the judge's 
instructions."). 
 
In sum, the district court did not err in dismissing 
Gallas' claims against Judge Sylvester and DiPrimio with 
respect to Judge Sylvester's order releasing the PFA. 
 
B. Legislative Immunity 
 
The next issue we address is whether Justices Zappala, 
Cappy, and Nigro, as well as Sobolevitch, are entitled to 
absolute legislative immunity with regard to Gallas' claims 
arising from his termination as Executive Administrator. 
The district court granted summary judgment with respect 
to Gallas' First Amendment claim on the ground that the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court's March 26 order reorganizing 
the FJD constituted a legislative act to which absolute 
immunity should attach. See Gallas, 1998 WL 352584, at 
*3-10. Our standard of review is plenary. See Doby v. 
DeCrescenzo, 171 F.3d 858, 867 (3d Cir. 1999). 
 
Legislators enjoy absolute immunity from liability for 
their legislative acts. See Bogan v. Scott-Harris, 523 U.S. 
44, 46, 118 S.Ct. 966, 969 (1998); Supreme Court of Va. v. 
Consumers Union of the United States, Inc., 446 U.S. 719, 
732, 100 S.Ct. 1967, 1974 (1980); Larsen v. Senate of Pa., 
152 F.3d 240, 249 (3d Cir. 1998), cert. denied , 525 U.S. 
1145, 119 S.Ct. 1041 (1999). In determining whether an 
official is entitled to legislative immunity, we must focus on 
the nature of the official's action rather than the official's 
motives or the title of his or her office. See Bogan, 523 U.S. 
at 54, 118 S.Ct. at 973 ("Whether an act is legislative turns 
on the nature of the act, rather than on the motive or 
intent of the official performing it."); Forrester, 484 U.S. at 
224, 108 S.Ct. at 542 ("Running through our cases. . . is 
a `functional' approach to immunity questions . .. . Under 
that approach, we examine the nature of the functions with 
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which a particular official or class of officials has been 
lawfully entrusted, and we seek to evaluate the effect that 
exposure to particular forms of liability would likely have on 
the appropriate exercise of those functions."); Larsen, 152 
F.3d at 253 ("Legislative immunity must be applied 
pragmatically, and not by labels."). 
 
In accordance with this functional approach, the 
Supreme Court has recognized that judges sometimes 
perform legislative actions. See Forrester, 484 U.S. at 227, 
108 S.Ct. at 544 (noting a distinction "between judicial acts 
and the administrative, legislative, or executive functions 
that judges may on occasion be assigned by law to 
perform") (emphasis added). Thus, in Consumers Union the 
Supreme Court afforded legislative immunity to the Virginia 
Supreme Court and its chief justice in connection with the 
promulgation of the state bar code. See Consumers Union, 
446 U.S. at 731-34, 100 S.Ct. at 1974-76 ("[T]he Virginia 
Court is exercising the State's entire legislative power with 
respect to regulating the Bar, and its members are the 
State's legislators for the purpose of issuing the Bar 
Code."). Similarly, we have indicated that non-legislators 
performing legislative functions may claim legislative 
immunity. See Aitchison v. Raffiani, 708 F.2d 96, 99-100 
(3d Cir. 1983) (holding that a mayor and a borough 
attorney were entitled to legislative immunity with respect 
to their involvement in the passage of an ordinance 
eliminating the plaintiff 's job position; stating that "we look 
to the function the individual performs rather than his 
location within a particular branch of government"); see 
also Bogan, 523 U.S. at 55, 118 S.Ct. at 973 ("We have 
recognized that officials outside the legislative branch are 
entitled to legislative immunity when they perform 
legislative functions . . . .") (citing Consumers Union). 
 
Accordingly, the question here is whether the justices of 
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court performed a legislative 
function when they issued the March 26 order reorganizing 
the FJD. We have employed a two-part test to determine 
whether an act is legislative: 
 
       First, the act must be `substantively' legislative, i.e., 
       legislative in character. Legislative acts are those which 
       involve policy-making decision [sic] of a general scope 
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       or, to put it another way, legislation involves line- 
       drawing. Where the decision affects a small number or 
       a single individual, the legislative power is not 
 
       implicated, and the act takes on the nature of 
       administration.14 In addition, the act must be 
       `procedurally' legislative, that is, passed by means of 
       established legislative procedures. This principle 
       requires that constitutionally accepted procedures of 
       enacting the legislation must be followed in order to 
       assure that the act is a legitimate, reasoned decision 
       representing the will of the people which the governing 
       body has been chosen to serve. 
 
Ryan v. Burlington County, 889 F.2d 1286, 1290-91 (3d Cir. 
1989). 
 
It is clear that the issuance of the March 26 order was a 
"substantively" legislative act. The Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court issued this order (as well as its prior orders relating 
to the reformation of the FJD) pursuant to a direct grant of 
rulemaking authority from the state constitution. Under the 
Pennsylvania Constitution, the Supreme Court "shall 
exercise general supervisory and administrative authority 
over all the courts," Pa. Const. art. V,  10(a), and it "shall 
appoint a court administrator and may appoint such 
subordinate administrators and staff as may be necessary 
and proper for the prompt and proper disposition of the 
business of all courts." Pa. Const. art. V,  10(b). Most 
significantly, the Supreme Court "shall have the power to 
prescribe general rules governing practice, procedure and 
the conduct of all courts . . . including . . . the 
administration of all courts and supervision of all officers of 
the judicial branch." Pa. Const. art. V,  10(c). See Callahan 
v. City of Philadelphia, No. 99-1816, ___ F.3d ___, 2000 WL 
311128, at *4-6 (3d Cir. Mar. 28, 2000). In essence, then, 
the Supreme Court performed the same type of function in 
issuing the March 26 order as the Pennsylvania General 
Assembly performs when it exercises its constitutionally 
granted power to pass legislative enactments. See Pa. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
14. Of course, in Ryan we did not mean to imply that a legislative body, 
passing a de jure law affecting only a single person, would not be 
entitled to legislative immunity. 
 
                                21 
Const. art. II,  1 ("The legislative power of this 
Commonwealth shall be vested in a General Assembly. . . .").15 
 
Further, the March 26 order involved a "policy-making 
decision of a general scope," rather than a decision 
"affect[ing] a small number or a single individual." See 
Ryan, 889 F.2d at 1291. Beyond eliminating Gallas' 
position, the order provided for a broad reorganization of 
the supervisory structure of the FJD. The order created an 
Administrative Governing Board to be comprised of local 
judges along with the Administrator of the Pennsylvania 
Courts. The Board was given specific duties and powers, 
including the selection of a Court Administrator and Budget 
Administrator and a responsibility to "monitor the overall 
performance of all courts and departments of the District in 
an attempt to achieve the very best court system possible." 
J.A. at 309-10. The order further identified the duties of the 
Court Administrator and the Budget Administrator and 
provided for the assignment of their staffs. J.A. at 310-11. 
In sum, the March 26 order represented a general overhaul 
of the FJD's administrative structure pursuant to the 
Supreme Court's constitutionally granted power to 
promulgate rules governing the operation of Pennsylvania 
courts. We must conclude, then, that the issuance of the 
order was a "substantively" legislative act. See Consumers 
Union, 446 U.S. at 731-34, 100 S.Ct. at 1974-76 (granting 
legislative immunity to state supreme court and its chief 
justice with respect to the exercise of the court's inherent 
power to issue the state's bar code).16  
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
15. Gallas argues that the quoted provisions of the Pennsylvania 
Constitution grant the Supreme Court the power to act "administratively" 
rather than "legislatively." See Appellant's Br. at 36, 41; see also 
Callahan, 2000 WL 311128, at *6. It is true that Article V, Section 10 
employs the term "administration." Yet, as we have indicated, 
"[l]egislative immunity must be applied pragmatically, and not by labels." 
Larsen, 152 F.3d at 253. It is clear that the Pennsylvania Constitution's 
broad grant of authority empowers the Supreme Court to make not only 
"administrative" decisions but also discretionary, policymaking decisions 
of a "legislative" nature with respect to the Pennsylvania courts. 
 
16. Gallas argues that the March 26 order was"administrative activity 
. . . not unlike one finds at the top of any number of large 
bureaucratically organized institutions, who manage through the 
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The Supreme Court recently recognized that the 
elimination of a public employment position -- as opposed 
to the firing of a single individual -- constitutes a 
"legislative" act. In Bogan, the plaintiff filed a section 1983 
action against various local officials, including the mayor 
and a member of the city council, alleging that an 
ordinance eliminating her position was motivated by racial 
animus and retaliation for her exercise of First Amendment 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
clarification of policies and through the organization and reorganization 
of agencies." Appellant's Br. at 40. Perhaps Gallas is suggesting that 
extending legislative immunity to the justices of the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court in this case will open the door to applying such 
immunity to other persons who undertake to reorganize the structure of 
public agencies or departments. We, however, in adjudicating this matter 
express no opinion on the precise reach of legislative immunity in other 
contexts. What we do say is that such immunity applies where the 
highest court of a state exercises its direct constitutional authority to 
promulgate rules and orders governing the "practice, procedure and . . . 
conduct" of state courts. See Pa. Const. art. V,  10(c). There can be no 
doubt that legislative immunity would apply if the Pennsylvania General 
Assembly were to pass a statute providing for the same form of 
reorganization which was created by the Supreme Court's March 26 
order. See Consumers Union, 446 U.S. at 733-34, 100 S.Ct. at 1975 
("[T]here is little doubt that if the Virginia Legislature had enacted the 
State Bar Code and if suit had been brought against the legislature, its 
committees, or members . . . the defendants in that suit could 
successfully have sought dismissal on the grounds of absolute legislative 
immunity."). 
 
In Consumers Union, it was argued that legislative immunity should 
not extend to the Virginia Supreme Court in connection with its 
promulgation of the state bar code because "many executive and agency 
officials wield authority to make rules in a wide variety of 
circumstances." See id. at 734, 100 S.Ct. at 1975. The Supreme Court 
rejected this argument, stating that "in this case the Virginia [Supreme] 
Court claims inherent power to regulate the Bar, and. . . [it] is 
exercising the State's entire legislative power with respect to regulating 
the Bar, and its members are the State's legislators for the purpose of 
issuing the Bar Code." Id. at 734, 100 S.Ct. at 1975-76. Like the Virginia 
Supreme Court, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court here exercised 
"inherent power" to regulate the lower courts and "its members are the 
State's legislators for the purpose of " regulating those courts. 
Accordingly, legislative immunity is appropriate. 
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rights. See Bogan, 523 U.S. at 47, 118 S.Ct. at 969. The 
Supreme Court held that the defendants' actions were both 
substantively and procedurally legislative: 
 
        This leaves us with the question whether, stripped of 
       all considerations of intent and motive, [defendants'] 
       actions were legislative. We have little trouble 
       concluding that they were. Most evidently, [the city 
       council member's] acts of voting for an ordinance were, 
       in form, quintessentially legislative. [The mayor's] 
       introduction of a budget and signing into law an 
       ordinance also were formally legislative, even though 
       he was an executive official . . . . 
 
        [Plaintiff], however, asks us to look beyond 
       [defendants'] formal actions to consider whether the 
       ordinance was legislative in substance. We need not 
       determine whether the formally legislative character of 
       [defendants'] actions is alone sufficient to entitle 
       [defendants] to legislative immunity, because here the 
       ordinance, in substance, bore all the hallmarks of 
       traditional legislation. The ordinance reflected a 
       discretionary, policymaking decision implicating the 
       budgetary priorities of the city and the services the city 
       provides to its constituents. Moreover, it involved the 
       termination of a position, which, unlike the hiring or 
       firing of a particular employee, may have prospective 
       implications that reach well beyond the particular 
       occupant of the office. And the city council, in 
       eliminating [plaintiff 's position], certainly governed in a 
       field where legislators traditionally have power to act. 
       Thus, [defendants'] activities were undoubtedly 
       legislative. 
 
Id. at 55-56, 118 S.Ct. at 973 (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted).17 In light of Bogan, the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court's "discretionary, policymaking 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
17. By comparison, in Forrester, 484 U.S. at 229-30, 108 S.Ct. at 545- 
46, the Court held that the demotion and discharge of a single employee 
was an administrative act, and hence not within the scope of judicial 
immunity. 
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decision" to eliminate the position of Executive 
Administrator should be classified as a legislative act.18 
 
Turning to the second prong of the Ryan test, the 
undisputed evidence indicates that the March 26 order was 
"procedurally" legislative. The record includes an affidavit 
from Justice Cappy describing the process by which the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court exercises its constitutional 
authority to oversee the lower courts: 
 
       The Supreme Court exercises this constitutional 
       authority by following certain established procedures: 
       proposals are circulated among the Justices; the 
       Justices engage in deliberation regarding the 
       proposals; after deliberation, the Justices vote; and, in 
       the event a proposal is adopted, the Court issues an 
       appropriate order. 
 
       . . . . 
 
       [With respect to the March 26 order,] the Justices of 
       the Court deliberated on the merits of various 
       alternatives to the Court's continued oversight of the 
       FJD. Following these deliberations, the Justices voted 
       to reorganize the administration of the FJD and 
       implement the Court's policy decision to return control 
       to the FJD judges and officials. Pursuant to its 
       deliberations and vote, on March 26, 1996, the 
       Supreme Court issued an order reorganizing the FJD 
       . . . . 
 
J.A. at 412, 418. Thus, as the evidence demonstrates, the 
Supreme Court determined in its discretion that the time 
had come to return the FJD to local control; the Justices 
then debated alternatives, voted, and issued a directive 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
18. Affidavits from Justices Cappy, Zappala, and Nigro indicate that the 
March 26 order resulted from an exercise of the Supreme Court's 
discretionary judgment that sufficient progress had been made in the 
reformation of the FJD as to justify a return to local control. J.A. at 
412, 
425, 427. Of course, the justices are entitled to legislative immunity 
regardless of their motive in making the March 26 order. 
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reorganizing the FJD. This procedure was no different from 
that which a legislature would follow in like circumstances.19 
 
In sum, the issuance of the March 26 order was both 
substantively and procedurally legislative, and accordingly 
the district court did not err in applying legislative 
immunity to Justices Zappala, Cappy, and Nigro with 
respect to claims arising from Gallas' termination as 
Executive Administrator. Having reached this conclusion, 
we must afford quasi-legislative immunity to Sobolevitch, 
whose role in the reorganization derived from the Supreme 
Court's order.20 See Aitchison, 708 F.2d at 99-100 (holding 
that borough attorney who "was acting in direct assistance 
of legislative activity" was entitled to absolute immunity). 
Indeed, Gallas' counsel conceded before the district court 
that Sobolevitch should receive immunity if the members of 
the Supreme Court are declared immune. J.A. at 667-68. 
See Gallas, 1998 WL 352584, at *9. 
 
C. Discovery Issues 
 
Gallas raises two challenges to the district court's 
management of discovery. First, Gallas challenges the 
district court's September 9, 1998 order quashing certain 
deposition subpoenas which he issued on or about March 
27, 1998. Gallas sought these depositions in part for the 
purpose of obtaining the identities of the Doe defendants 
designated in his complaint. The district court precluded 
Gallas from conducting depositions for this purpose 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
19. We are not suggesting that our result would have been different if the 
Supreme Court had adopted the March 26 order with fewer procedural 
steps. 
 
20. Although the district court addressed legislative immunity only with 
respect to the First Amendment claim in Count IV, such immunity also 
bars Gallas' procedural due process claim as against these four 
defendants. Thus, we need not determine whether the district court 
erred in dismissing the due process claim for failure to show the 
deprivation of a liberty or property interest. 
 
Aside from Zappala, Cappy, Nigro, and Sobolevitch, Gallas asserted the 
First Amendment and due process claims in Count IV against several 
other defendants. The district court dismissed these claims against these 
other defendants on grounds which Gallas does not challenge here. See 
Gallas, 1997 WL 256972, at *6-22. 
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because it concluded that, even if Gallas identified the Doe 
defendants, it simply was too late for their service in 
accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m) and it likewise was too 
late for Gallas to amend his complaint to assert timely 
claims against them. In this connection, the district court 
held that any amendment of the complaint to name the Doe 
defendants would not relate back to the date of the original 
complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(3). J.A. at 897. 
 
On this appeal, Gallas argues that he should have been 
permitted to conduct depositions for the purpose of 
identifying the Doe defendants who released his PFA and 
divorce file. He argues that the district court erred with 
respect to Rule 4(m), but he presents no argument 
regarding timeliness or relation-back. Gallas' section 1983 
claims relating to the releases of the PFA and divorce file 
are subject to Pennsylvania's two-year limitations period for 
personal injury claims. See Sameric Corp. of Delaware, Inc. 
v. City of Philadelphia, 142 F.3d 582, 599 (3d Cir. 1998). 
The alleged releases took place in September 1995 and 
again on or before March 23, 1996. Accordingly, in the 
absence of relation-back, any amendment of the complaint 
after March 23, 1998, to name the Doe defendants with 
respect to the last of the releases would be time-barred. 
Yet, Gallas makes no attempt to point out anything in the 
record indicating that the strict requirements for relation- 
back under Rule 15(c)(3) have been met. See Nelson v. 
County of Allegheny, 60 F.3d 1010, 1014 n.6 (3d Cir. 1995) 
(replacing a John Doe with a party's real name amounts to 
"changing a party" under Rule 15(c)(3)). Accordingly, we will 
not disturb the district court's decision to quash the 
subpoenas. 
 
Second, Gallas contends that the district court erred in 
refusing to grant him additional time to conduct discovery 
with respect to his interference with employment claim. On 
November 10, 1998, more than two years after Gallas 
commenced this action and more than six months after the 
discovery deadline passed, the district court entered an 
order granting summary judgment in favor of Fumo, Brady, 
and the Democratic City Committee on the ground that 
Gallas had failed to come forward with any evidence that 
these defendants attempted to influence the members of 
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21. We do not imply that Fumo, Brady, and the Democratic City 
Committee could be liable for attempting to influence the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court with respect to the administrative structure in the FJD. 
After all, imposition of liability for such conduct would have First 
Amendment implications of its own. Moreover, it is not immediately 
evident why persons interested in public affairs should be liable for 
trying to influence a body exercising legislative functions to act in a 
particular way. In view of our disposition of the case we, however, have 
no need to consider this substantive point. 
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to terminate him. 21 In so 
ruling, the district court declined to extend the discovery 
deadline any further. J.A. at 1146. 
 
Our standard of review with regard to the district court's 
management of discovery is abuse of discretion. See 
Massachusetts Sch. of Law at Andover, Inc. v. American Bar 
Ass'n, 107 F.3d 1026, 1032 (3d Cir. 1997). "[W]e will not 
upset a district court's conduct of discovery procedures 
absent a demonstration that the court's action made it 
impossible to obtain crucial evidence, and implicit in such 
a showing is proof that more diligent discovery was 
impossible." In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litig., 685 F.2d 810, 
818 (3d Cir. 1982) (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(emphasis in original). The record indicates that Gallas had 
sufficient time to conduct discovery during the 25 months 
between the filing of his complaint and the entry of 
summary judgment on the interference with employment 
claim, despite the fact that relatively brief stays of discovery 
occupied some of that time. Accordingly, we find no abuse 
of discretion. See Massachusetts Sch. of Law, 107 F.3d at 
1034 ("[T]he district court, by allowing fairly extensive 
discovery and then closing discovery and entertaining the 




For the foregoing reasons, the orders of the district court 
challenged by Gallas on this appeal will be affirmed. 
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